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of this standard in three respects. First, the classification itself was deemed
arbitrary, despite the fact that it did to some extent accomplish the objec-
tives of the statute. Second, the court questioned the propriety of the statu-
tory objectives in relation to the burden imposed on individuals within the
ambit of the statutory bar to recovery. Third, even if it is assumed that
the objectives are legitimate and the classification is reasonable, the court
demonstrated that the classification involved was an ineffective method of
accomplishing the objectives of the guest statute. In sum, the court refused
to submit to the presumption of validity which courts have traditionally
given legislative enactments but rather examined the statute in terms of its
internal rationality and its external effect.
Dana G. Kirk
United States v. Cartwright-A New Estate Tax
Valuation Criterion for Mutual Fund Shares
In accordance with estate tax provisions requiring that the value of all
property held by a decedent at the time of death be included in the gross
estate,' the executor of the decedent's estate reported the value of mutual
fund shares held by the decedent at their net asset value, the price at which
the fund will redeem its outstanding shares. Pursuant to Treasury Regula-
tion section 20.2031-8(b) which provides that mutual fund shares are to
be valued at their public offering price at the date of death,2 the Com-
missioner assessed a deficiency. The executor paid the deficiency and filed
a timely claim for refund. Upon denial of this claim the executor ini-
tiated a refund action in federal district court, contending that Treasury
Regulation section 20.2031-8(b) prescribed an unreasonable valuation cri-
terion. The district court ruled in favor of the executor and declared the
regulation invalid.8  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.4
The Supreme Court, noting a conflict among the circuits, granted certiorari.
Held affirmed: Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-8(b) is invalid
and decedent's mutual fund shares should be valued at their redemption
price, rather than the public offering price. United States v. Cartwright,
411 U.S. 546 (1973).
I. MUTUAL FUNDS AND THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Mutual Funds. A mutual fund is an investment management company
which continuously sells redeemable shares in itself and invests the pro-
ceeds in securities of various types. Mutual fund shares, although tras-
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2031, 2033.
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963).
3 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
4 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ferable, are not traded in any securities market. Instead, shareholders
wishing to dispose of their shares must have them redeemed by the fund.5
Redemption is generally upon demand at a price approximately equal to
the net asset value per share on the day of redemption.6 Because of the
structure and the activities of such companies, they are regulated under the
provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 7
. The price at which the shares are offered to the public ordinarily includes
a sales or "load" charge which passes to the underwriter as compensation
for marketing the fund's shares. 8 The load charge varies with the particular
fund up to a maximum of about nine percent of the public offering price,
with lesser percentages being charged for quantity sales. Thus, at a given
time mutual fund shares reflect two prices, one at which the public may
purchase the shares and another, lower price, at which the fund will redeem
the shares, the difference between the two figures being equal to the sales
charge.
The Treasury Regulation. Section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides that for estate tax computation purposes, "[tihe value of the gross es-
tate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest there-
in of the decedent at the time of his death."9  "Value" is defined as "fair
market value," which, according to the test employed by the regulations, is
"the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."' 0
Prior to 1963 the Commissioner had no fixed policy for the valuation of
mutual fund shares. Accordingly, estate tax returns valued them at various
levels, including the redemption price, the mean between the redemption
and public offering prices, and the public offering price." In response to
the resulting confusion and in accordance with Internal Revenue Service
demands for a public offering price valuation, the Treasury Department
in that year promulgated Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-8(b):
5 Mutual funds are more properly termed "open-end" investment management com-
panies. "Open-end" refers to the redemption characteristic. In contrast, "closed-end"
companies do not redeem outstanding securities or engage in the continuous sale of
new securities, and the shares of such companies are normally bought and sold in
securities markets. See generally SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
6 This figure is normally computed -twice daily by subtracting the company's liabili-
ties from the total market value of its assets, and dividing by the number of outstanding
shares. It is listed on the financial pages as the "bid" price. H.R. REP. No. 2337,
supra note 5, at 204 n.8.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3-5 (1970). The Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 all apply to investment companies,
but are concerned primarily with disclosure and prevention of fraud. "Because the
relatively liquid, mobile, and readily negotiable assets of investment companies af-
forded unusual opportunities to the unscrupulous, Congress determined the earlier
statutes were inadequate . . . and passed a special regulatory statute-the Investment
Company Act." H.R. Rep. No. 2337, supra note 5, at 9.
8 A distinct minority of mutual funds, referred to as "no-load funds," do not include
this charge and therefore the redemption and public offering prices are identical.
Id. at 51.
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
10 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
11 Cf. Rev. Proc. 64-18, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 681-82.
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"The fair market value of a share in an open-end investment company
(commonly known as a 'mutual fund') is the public offering price of a
share, adjusted for any reduction in price available to the public in ac-
quiring the number of shares being valued.' ' 2
I1. JUDICIAL CONFLICT
In challenging the valuation criterion, taxpayers were initially disadvan-
taged by judicial policy with respect to treasury regulations. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly stated that where the validity of a treasury
regulation is in question, the role of the judiciary will be a limited one,
and the regulations must be sustained unless they are unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statute.' 3  "Congress has delegated to
the Commissioner, not the courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement' of the Internal Revenue Code.' 1 4  Be-
cause of this delegation, the role of the courts "begins and ends with assur-
ing that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to imple-
ment the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner."' 5
Despite a reluctance on the part of many courts' to disturb the judg-
ment of the Commissioner in his delegated authority, a similar number' 7
were sufficiently convinced of the contested regulation's inherent unrea-
sonableness to declare it invalid. The first challenge produced perhaps the
clearest illustration of the differing approaches. In Estate of Frances Foster
Wells' 8 the Tax Court narrowly upheld the validity of the regulation by
a margin of seven/six. The majority, noting that mutual fund shares
had been grouped in the regulations with certain insurance policies
and annuity contracts' 9 rather than with ordinary stocks and bonds, 20 rea-
"2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) ('963).
'3 Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
14 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306 (1967), quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a)
(1970).
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970), afrg sub nor. Estate of Frances Foster Wells, 50 T.C.
871 (1968). While acknowledging that "[liogical argument can be made for either the
bid price or the asked price as the criterion of value for mutual fund shares," the court
determined that "if it [the Commissioner's chosen criterion] is a reasonable one, we are
not at liberty to second guess him." Id. at 1304. See also Howell v. United States, 414
F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969) (identical gift tax regulation upheld); Norton v. United States,
70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,831 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Estate of Lovina R. York, 28 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1271 (1969).
17 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g 306
F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969): "It [the sales charge] adds nothing to the value of
the shares and does not thereafter constitute an element in computing actual worth.
To apply the estate tax rate to the sales charge paid is to impose a tax on a non-
existent 'interest of the decedent.' " See also Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474,
480 (D. Colo. 1971), where the court said that "to include the fictitious sales com-
mission in the value of the shares to the estate is to create an artificial value that cannot
possibly be obtained by the estate in any readily accessible, realistic market."I8 50 T.C. 871 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d
1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
19 Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8, as amended in 1963, is entitled: "Valuation
of certain life insurance and annuity contracts; Valuation of shares in an open-end
investment company."
20 Fair market value for ordinary stocks and bonds is determined by the regulations
to be the mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the date of death.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1959).
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soned that that was "recognition that investment company shares are a
different breed of cats from ordinary stocks and bonds; and when it comes
to valuing them, a different criterion can reasonably be applied, more nearly
like that applied to life insurance and annuity contracts .... ,,21 Single-
premium life insurance policies had presented a unique valuation problem
and were therefore afforded special treatment in the regulations.2 2  Some
courts23 when faced with the valuation problem of life insurance policies
in a gift tax context, had decided that the cost of replacement was the proper
criterion rather than the cash-surrender value because the policy holder
or beneficiary's rights were more than the right to surrender. The policy
could be retained and the face value realized upon the insured's death.
"All the economic benefits of a policy must be taken into consideration in
determining its value .... -24 Similarly, the Wells court reasoned that
"[t]he estate and the beneficiaries may continue to own the mutual fund
shares, and if they do, they would enjoy all the benefits of ownership of
the stock, including not only the right to redeem, but also the right to continue
to hold the stock and to receive dividends."2 It was therefore considered
appropriate to value them for tax purposes at their replacement cost, which,
in the context of their market, was the public offering price.
Another argument in favor of the regulation's validity advanced by the
majority in Wells concerned the employment of the "willing buyer-willing
seller" test of fair market value.26  The majority reasoned that, inasmuch
as the fund was statutorily required to redeem the shares at the net asset
value, it could not be considered a "willing buyer" at that price. The
only bona fide willing buyer-willing seller situation was the original issue
of the shares at the public offering price, and consequently that was the
proper measure of value for estate tax purposes.27
Judge Tannenwald's dissent in Wells25 articulated the opposing viewpoint.
He argued that mutual fund shares were not comparable to single-premium
life insurance policies because such shares do not have any value over and
above the redemption price offered by the company. 29 He preferred to
21 50 T.C. at 876.
22The regulations specify that the cost of replacement rather than the cash-
surrender value is proper measure of value for single-premium life insurance policies.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1963).
23 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941).
24 Id.
25 50 T.C. at 877. See also Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir.
1969): "Although we recognize differences between single-premium life insurance
policies and shares of an open-end investment company, we view Guggenheim as sup-
porting the Commissioner's position that the valuation of shares in light of their public
offering or replacement price is permissible."
26 50 T.C. at 876.
27 See also Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1969): "[I]t is our
opinion that, because from the donor's standpoint his mutual fund shares are not assets
that can be readily sold on an open market, valuing the shares on the basis of their
redemption price is not warranted."
28 50 T.C. at 878.
29See Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 949, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1969), ajf'd, 460
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972): "[Y]et unlike those life insurance and annuity contracts,
shares in an open-end investment company do not have any value over and above the
redemption price offered by the company. To value the shares of an open-end invest-
ment company at the public offering price rather than the redemption price is, in
1973]
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analogize the mutual fund vduation problem with that of a stock or bond
subject to a restriction, such as a right of first refusal. In that situation the
treasury regulations specify that the contract price can be used to deter-
mine the value of the securities for estate tax purposes.A0 Similarly, Tan-
nenwald reasoned that mutual funds are subject to a restriction, in that they
can be disposed of only at the redemption price, and therefore that price
should dictate the value for tax purposes."'
III. UNITED STATES V. CARTWRIGHT
In United Slates v. Cartwright3 2 the Supreme Court agreed with previous
decisions ruling the regulation invalid, resting its decision on the regulation's
inconsistency with the market scheme for mutual funds, as created and
regulated by the Investment Company Act. Mr. Justice White, writing
for the majority, perceived a fallacy in the simplistic application of the
willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value espoused by the Gov-
ernment. The argument that the public offering price was the only price
at which a willing buyer and a willing seller met voluntarily, and that it,
therefore, was the proper valuation "unrealistically bifurcates the statu-
tory scheme for the trading in mutual fund shares." 33  The market actually
consisted of not only the original purchase of the shares at the public of-
fering price, but included as part and parcel of the sales contract the agree-
ment to sell them back to the fund at the lesser redemption price. Inasmuch
as each party was fully cognizant of these elements of the market, "the
redemption price may thus be properly viewed only as the final step in a
voluntary transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller."'8 4  The
Court reasoned that the shareholder could not, under the Investment Com-
pany Act, receive the public offering price from the fund, which in practi-
cality was the only possible buyer. The fund used the public offering price
in selling its shares to the public, but in fact never received that price, pay-
ing the difference between it and the net asset value directly to the under-
writer. Therefore, the Court concluded that the regulation "purports to
assign a value to mutual fund shares that the estate could not hope to ob-
tain and that the fund could not offer."85
essence, an estate tax penalty for investing in open-end investment shares rather than
some other type of property."
30 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1965).
3' See Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1972); Davis v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 949, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1969), a/I'd, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1972): "[Allthough there is no binding contract in this case, the rationale of Treas.
Reg. 20.2031-2(h) (1958) should apply to open-end investment shares because the re-
demption price offered by the company truly represents the only realistic value that
the estate can obtain for the shares of an open-end investment company."
32 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
33 Id. at 552.
34 Id.
35 Id. The artificiality of the valuation criterion was made evident under the
fact situation in Cartwright. The decedent never actually paid the public offering
price, because she acquired her shares by gift, inheritance, and under an option offered
by most funds which allows purchase at the redemption price by re-investing capital
gains and ordinary dividends. Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 772
(W.D.N.Y. 1971).
[Vol. 27
The Court expressed approval of Judge Tannenwald's analogy of mutual
fund shares to an ordinary stock or bond subject to a restriction on sale,
and conclusively disposed of the single-premium life insurance policy an-
alogy. With regard to stocks and bonds, the logic was so persuasive the
Court could see no difference between the two situations, certainly none
meriting such diverse treatment in the treasury regulations.3 6  As for the
insurance policies, the court perceived no similarities with respect to valua-
tion problems. The Wells court, it felt, had correctly recognized that mutual
fund shares were "a different breed of cats" from ordinary stocks and
bonds, but erred in identifying the "breed" as similar to single-premium
life insurance policies. These policies are subject to appreciation in value,
and therefore clearly possess beneficial economic elements above their im-
mediate cash-surrender value. The peculiar difficulty in valuing those bene-
fits led the courts in the gift tax cases to defer to the replacement cost val-
uation because it more accurately reflected the "bundle of rights" incident
to ownership.37  In contrast, mutual fund shares have no value, for tax
purposes, above the redemption price, a figure obtainable "by turning the
financial pages of a newspaper."38 The Court pointed out that there are
certainly "investment virtues" to the shareholder, such as potential capital
gains and dividends, but the same is true of any security, upon none of
which are brokerage fees assessed. "The Commissioner cannot cross-breed
life insurance and investment trust shares by the simple expedient of dis-
cussing them in separate paragraphs of a single regulation."3 9
Finally, in resting their decision on the contested regulation's inconsis-
tency with the statutory framework in which mutual funds operate, the
Court apparently found sufficient ground to overcome the judicial "hands
off" policy with respect to treasury regulations. Despite the fact that the
taxpayer's argument had "the clear ring of common sense to it,' '4 ° many
courts4' had stubbornly refused to declare Treasury Regulation section
20.2031-8(b) invalid because it was not "plainly inconsistent" with the
revenue statutes. This judicial policy seemingly inflated the probative
weight of rather ephemeral arguments. Judicial reluctance manifested it-
self again in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Cartwright.42 It is sug-
gested, however, that the majority did no damage to the integrity of the
"unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" standard in declaring Treasury Reg-
ulation section 20.2031-8(b) invalid. While acknowledging that although
the regulation might not be "on its face, technically inconsistent with See-
36 The Court stated with regard to the "restriction" on mutual fund shares: "Those
shares may not be 'sold' back at the public offering price. By statute, they must be
'sold' back to the mutual fund only at the redemption price. We see no valid justi-
fication for disregarding this reality ...... 411 U.S. at 554.
37 See, e.g., Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941).
38 411 U.S. at 556.
39 Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo. 1971).40 411 U.S. at 551.
41 E.g., Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970); Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969); Norton v.
United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,831 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Estate of Lovina R.
York, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1271 (1969).
42 411 U.S. at 557.
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tion 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code," the Court determined that "it is
manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary provisions of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 and operates without regard for the market
in mutual funds that the act created and regulates. '4 3  The Court con-
cluded:
We agree with Judge Tannenwald, who stated at the very outset of the
dispute over Regulation Section 20.2031-8(b), that 'it does not follow
that, because the Commissioner has a choice of alternatives, his choice
should be sustained where the alternative chosen is unrealistic. In
such a situation the regulations embodying that choice should be held
to be unreasonable.' 44
rv. CONCLUSION
In resolving a decade of conflict, the Supreme Court in Cartwright laid
down a rule of decision that will also affect the gift and income tax sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code. The former tax regulations contain
an identical provision concerning valuation for gift tax purposes, and it is
assumed that is now also invalid.45 Since for income tax purposes the value
of property for estate and gift tax purposes becomes the basis for the heir
or donee, the income tax is also affected with respect to recognition of
gain or loss upon sale or transfer.46  Perhaps most important for the in-
vestor and estate planner, the Cartwright decision enhances the attraction
of the already popular mutual fund investment medium.
Kevin Flynn
43 Id. At least one court stated that the regulation wau inconsistent with § 2033,
which provides that the gross estate shall include the value of all property "to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent ....... INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
"By no stretch of the imagination does the decedent have an 'interest' in the . . . sales
load. He cannot make a transfer so that his transferee may realize this amount; he
cannot realize it himself either as part of his own certificate or separated from it."
Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1972).
44 411 U.S. at 557.
45 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(b) (1963). Estate and gift tax laws should be construed
harmoniously in absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary.
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1945).
46 IT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1014, 1015.
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